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be and, in the case of subscription and theatre-TV, already have been expended
in the development and perfection of new transmission techniques. Certainly the
present Commission policy of refusing to conduct hearings concerned with
"mere paper ideas" should be reconsidered. 93 Viewed in relation with the history
of radio, TV's problems seem to warrant separate legislative treatment. 94
THE -PEWEE CASE-COMPENSATION FOR SEIZURE
OF A GOING BUSINESS
Though the "national emergency" strike may be a rarer occurrence than one
might suppose," there is little doubt that government seizure of struck or strike-
threatened businesses was an extremely useful technique for maintaining unin-
terrupted production in important industries during World War II and the re-
conversion period.2 But if the technique was useful, it was also ill-defined. In-
deed, as one observer has noted, "There is ground for suspecting that the Gov-
ernment consciously avoided any formulation of rules or principles relating to
seizure."3 The Supreme Court, equally reticent for the most part, has done its
defining piecemeal. In United States v. United Mine Workers,4 for example, the
Court refused to define the relationship between the government and the owner
of a seized coal mine, and held that as between the government and the em-
ployees an employer-employee relationship existed for some purposes but might
not exist for others. In United States v. Pewee Coal Co.,s a case arising out of the
seizure of the nation's coal mines in 194 3 (but not decided until i95i), the
Supreme Court was called upon to define the relationship between the govern-
ment and the owner of a seized business. Confusion rather than definition was
the result. 6
The specific question confronting the Court in the Pewee case was: Who bears
the losses when a business is temporarily seized by the government and contin-
ued in operation for profit largely under the management of the owner? The
Pewee Coal Company was seized by the government on May i and held until
9" See Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 420-421 (i951).
94 Meanwhile, the forthcoming decision of the Supreme Court in the "captive radio" case
may contain some meaningful implications. Pollack v. Public Utilities Commission of the
District of Columbia, 191 F. 2d 450 (App. D.C., i951), cert. granted 72 S. Ct. 77, 80 ('951).
In the usual arrangement, the transit company enters into a contract with a middleman to
install FM receivers in public transportation vehicles at no cost to the utility, both parties
securing their income on a concurrent arrangement with the FM broadcasting station. The
commuters thus ride to the chant of LSMFT. The Court of Appeals held the operations viola-
tive of the Fifth Amendment. Ibid. For an excellent discussion, see Shipley, Some Constitu-
tional Aspects of Transit Radio, ii F.C. Bar J. i5o (1950).
' Warren, Thirty-Six Years of "National Emergency" Strikes, 5 Indust. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3
(195).
2 Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 1017 (1947).
3Ibid., at 1054. s 341 U.S. 114 (i95i).
4 330 U.S. 258 (i947). 6 See Business Week, p. 30 (May 5, ig5i).
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October 12, 1943 in order to end a strike of its miners and to insure the con-
tinued production of its coal.7 Pewee's president was appointed the agent of the
government to run the mine and during the period of governmental control re-
ceived various directives, such as orders to fly the American flag, to post
placards reading "United States Property" on company premises, and to keep
separate books for the period of government operations. But the only directive
which substantially interfered with the conduct of Pewee's business was an
order for the payment of a wage increase in accordance with a decision of the
War Labor Board.8 The increase was paid by Pewee and during the period of
governmental control amounted to $2,241.26. Total losses in the same period
were $36,128.96 and Pewee sued in the Court of Claims to recover this amount. 9
It asked for the $36,128.96 not as compensation for the use of its property but as
reimbursement for losses which should have been borne by the government but
which were, in fact, borne by the company.'0
The Court of Claims, although it held that Pewee's property was "taken"
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment," refused to allow the claim for
$36,128.96 but did award Pewee $2,241.26 on the theory that the government
must bear only that part of operating losses caused by its actions.12 Certiorari
was granted upon application by the government. 3 Pewee, however, did not
7Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 Fed. Reg. 5695 (1943); "Order for Taking Possession" of the
Secretary of the Interior, Order No. i8io, 8 Fed. Reg. 5767 (1943). The executive order which
directed the seizure of the mines did not refer to any specific statutory authorization for such
action but read: "Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:.. ." However, the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, passed on September 16, i94o, did provide the President with authority
to seize companies which refused to comply with government orders for products or ma-
terials. Mines were not mentioned. Selective Training and Service Act of i94o, at § 9, 54
Stat. 885 (1940), So U.S.C.A. App. § 309 (i94). This section was amended on June 25, 1943,
after the seizure of Pewee and other mines, by the passage of the War Labor Disputes Act,
which added to Section 9 of the Training and Service Act a paragraph empowering the Presi-
dent to seize any vital plant or mine whose operations had stopped or were threatened with
stoppage because of a labor dispute. War Labor Disputes Act, at § 3, 57 Stat. 163 (1943),
5O U.S.C.A. App. §§ 3o9, ~o53 (1944). See, for discussions of the President's seizure powers,
National Emergencies and the President's Inherent Powers, 2 Stanf. L. Rev. 303 (1950);
Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 6o Harv. L. Rev. X17, 1040-44 (1947). For
a discussion of proposed legislation, see the note in 37 Cornell L.Q. 91 (1951).
8 Findings 8 and 12, Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, uiS Ct. Cl. 626, 642, 65o (ig5o).
The War Labor Board Order may be found in 9 War Lab. Rep. 112 (i944). The Board was
created by Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942). Section 5 of the War Labor Disputes
Act provides, "Any such order of the Board shall, upon approval by the President, be com-
piled with by the Government agency operating such plant, mine, or facility." 57 Stat. x63
(1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1505 (1944).
9 Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl., 195o).
10 Brief for the Plaintiff at 181-82.
, ".... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. Amend. S.
12 Pewee Coal Co.v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426, 431 (Ct. Cl., 1950).
'3 United States v Pewee Coal Co., 340 U.S. 8o8 (195o).
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seek review, and therefore the question before the Supreme Court was whether
the Court of Claims erred in allowing Pewee $2,241.26, not whether there was
error in refusing to allow $36,128.96.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the Court of Claims.4
Two opinions were written in support of the decision, one of which, Justice
Reed's, agreed with the theory of the Court of Claims. The other, by Justice
Black, with Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson concurring, would have
awarded the full $36,128.96, had a claim for this amount been before the Court,
on the theory that since the government had taken Pewee's business it was re-
sponsible for the subsequent operation of that business. Because, however, the
disposition of total losses was not a question before the Court, these Justices also
voted to affirm the Court of Claims decision. Justice Burton, writing a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Clark and Minton concurred,
would have reversed the Court of Claims and allowed Pewee nothing, appar-
ently on the theory that the government had not fully taken Pewee's business
and that Pewee was therefore obliged to prove what it had lost because of the
government action, a burden which it had failed to sustain. Thus, although all
nine Justices agreed there had been a "taking" of Pewee's property, they dis-
agreed as to the nature and consequences of that "taking." A majority of five
Justices held that Pewee should be awarded some of its losses and a different
majority of five Justices held that the government should not bear total operat-
ing losses, Justice Reed's position placing him in both groups.
It was the theory of Justice Black's opinion that the government took the
right to operate the Pewee coal business and, as an incident of that taking, the
right to retain the profits and the obligation to bear the losses of its operations.'*
It was also a part of this theory that the proper measure of compensation for the
temporary taking of Pewee's business was the fair rental value of the business
for the period of government control.,6 On this view, the government's status as
temporary proprietor was not changed because it chose to appoint Pewee's presi-
dent its agent to run the mine instead of ousting the management and appoint-
ing other agents. Similarly, no weight would be given to the fact that the gov-
ernment clearly did not intend to become temporary proprietor with the right to
retain profits and the obligation to bear losses.'7 The crucial fact was that the
14 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
's "It follows almost as a matter of course from our holding in United Mine Workers that
the Government here 'took' Pewee's property and became engaged in the mining business....
Whatever might have been Pewee's losses had it been left free to exercise its own business
judgment, the crucial fact is that the government chose to intervene by taking possession and
operating control. By doing so, it became the proprietor and, in the absence of contrary ar-
rangements, was entitled to the benefits and subject to the liabilities which that status in-
volves." United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, ii6-1T, II8-I9 (i95i).
16 Ibid., at 117 ,
17 The Coal Mines Regulations, Section 6o3.5(b), 8 Fed. Reg. 6655 (1943); Letter of the
Director of Production of the Solid Fuels Administration to Pewee's president, July 31, 1943,
Trans. Rec. at 66o-6i, Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, r15 Ct. Cl. 626 (ig5o).
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government "took" the mine, as evidenced by the language of the seizure
orders. 18
Under Justice Black's theory, then, the situation was analogous to that of a
lease relationship, Pewee being the lessor and the government the lessee of the
business. Pewee, however, did not ask rental value for the use of its property; it
asked, rather, to be reimbursed for operating losses sustained by it while its
property was being used by the government. Under the "lease" analogy these
losses should have been borne by the government, as they would have been
borne by an ordinary lessee of the business; and, had Pewee requested cer-
tiorari, an application of this theory of the taking would have resulted in an
award of $36,128.96. Since Pewee had not sought review, Justice Black and the
Justices concurring in his opinion voted to affirm the Court of Claims decision.
In thus applying the lease theory to the Pewee case, Justice Black was not
required to discuss the problem of measuring rental value. Nonetheless, his opin-
ion states, "The Government's profit and loss experience may well be one factor
involved in computing reasonable compensation for a temporary taking."19 To
take account of this factor, where losses sustained during government operations
were unforeseeable, would be to depart from a strict lease theory, for an ordinary
lessee would pay rent based on his expectation of profit at the time of the leas-
ing. Where losses were foreseeable, however, Justice Black could, consistently
with his theory, treat losses as a factor in the determination of rent and probably
even uphold a finding of zero rental value .2
Application of the lease theory where the seized business returned a profit
would allow the government to keep the profits and, of course, obligate it to pay
rent. If the rental value were said to be equal to net profits (after the payment of
WLB-approved wage increases) during government operation, owners would be
placed in a difficult bargaining position. Employees would know that if the
owner refused to pay higher wages, the government, after a seizure made neces-
sary by a strike, would pay them and pay them with company funds. Labor
would thus be given an incentive to strike.2' But this consideration does not
operate more strongly against the lease theory than against any other, for, on
X8 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. '14, 115-i6 (i95i).
9 Ibid., at xi8.
20 As to the foreseeability of Pewee's losses, see Findings x5 and 16, Pewee Coal Co. v.
United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 626, 658-64 (io9o). Because Justice Black uses the phrase "operat-
ing losses" throughout, it is likely that the losses he would require the government to bear
do not include ordinary depreciation and depletion costs. These would, of course, enter into
a determination of rental value. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. x, 4
(1949)-
21 If the formula used to determine the rent usually resulted in an award lower than net
profits, owners would be placed in the still more difficult bargaining position of having to
grant labor's demands to avoid a strike or run the risk of a seizure which would divest them
of a portion of expected profits. Nevertheless, rental value might reasonably be determined to
be less than the net profits because of the shift of the entrepreneurial risk to the government.
This would, of course, increase the willingness of a particularly sanguine owner to pay the
higher wages demanded.
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the assumption that during an emergency government will not allow a strike in
a vital industry to continue, labor will always have a greater incentive to strike
than in the usual bargaining situation where, if wage demands are too high, the
employer will at least temporarily close shop. And even this observation would
be accurate only so long as a government wage award-a War Labor Board
order, for example-no matter by whom it was paid, would be likely to amount
to more than the employees could get through collective bargaining with the
owner.
Justice Burton's theory of the taking must be inferred because it is not stated
explicitly. From a reading of the dissenting opinion, it is not clear what the gov-
ernment had taken. 2 Apparently, however, it was the view of the dissenting
Justices that the government had not ousted Pewee from possession and control
of its mine and that therefore Pewee had not lost that use of its property for
which rental value is a proper measure of compensation. In this view, Pewee
would recover nothing unless there were a showing that it would have lost less
than $36,128.96 had the government not taken its property. Whereas Justice
Black emphasized the language of the seizure orders, the dissenting opinion
would seem to give greatest weight to the circumstance that Pewee remained in
physical possession of its property and, in every respect but one, retained usual
managerial prerogatives and continued to make managerial decisions. 23
It was evidently Justice Burton's view, then, that since Pewee had not lost
the use of its property, it must show what loss it did suffer because of the govern-
ment taking.24 According to the dissenting opinion, this could be done only by
showing that greater losses had been sustained as a result of the taking than
would have been sustained in the absence of a taking. This, of course, makes
proof of compensable loss a practical impossibility, for an owner will only oper-
ate his business where it is profitable for him to do so. Therefore, where business
operations are discontinued solely because of a strike,-the owner of such a busi-
ness could not show that he had been harmed by a government seizure which
put the struck plant back into operation and which made it unnecessary for him
to bear the financial burden of an idle business. 25 Nor could he ordinarily prove
that benefits greater than this burden would have resulted from his strike
strategy without a showing of when the strike would have ended and on what
terms-an impossible burden of proof. In the dissenting view, then, companies
which had been seized because of a strike, but whose officers had retained sub-
"See the suggestion in the Brief for the United Sthtes on writ of certiorari to the Court
of Claims in the Pewee case, at 53.
23 For the situation when the government "really" takes a business, see the Brief for the
United States on writ of certiorari to the Court of Claims, at 36, United States v. Wheelock
Bros., Inc, 34r U.S. 3r9 (x95z).
'4 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. i4, 122 (i95i).
2S Benefits to the claimant are to be recognized in measuring just compensation. United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (i943). See Brief for the United States on writ of certiorari
to the Court of Claims in Pewee, at 89-95.
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stantially complete managerial control, could not recover compensation for the
seizure.
One cannot ascertain whether Justice Burton would continue to treat the
government's action as a noncompensable taking where the owner was dispos-
sessed of his plant and ousted from management.21 But it is likely that he would
not do so if the taking were as complete as the taking of motor carriers by the
government during World War UI, where the government ousted company
officers and replaced them with government employees, transferred company
funds to a government account, took out licenses in its own name, and in general
asserted complete operational control.27 Under these circumstances the fact
of the loss of the use of property for which rental value is the measure of com-
pensation could easily be established. In any case, it is clear that for Justice
Burton the taking of a small degree of managerial control is not such a taking
of the use of business property as will justify recovery of rental value. To re-
cover for the taking of a limited degree of control, as in the Pewee case, the owner
must prove what financial loss the taking caused. At some point so much control
would be taken as to amount to a taking of the use of the business and rental
value would be recoverable. The Pewee case did not require Justice Burton to
announce precisely where he would draw the line.
Justice Reed's opinion, like the dissent, refuses to treat the government as a
lessee because the full use of the property was not taken by the government.
Justice Reed distinguishes between a taking "in which the owners are ousted
from operation, their business suspended, and the property devoted to new
uses . . ."28 and the taking of the Pewee Coal Company which did not involve
the ousting of the owners from operation but only the taking of "the responsi-
bility of its [the property's] direction and employment" and the "supervision of
a losing business,"' 9 not the use of property. This latter, "supervisory" kind of
taking, according to Justice Reed, "ought not to place upon the Government the
burden of the losses incurred during that supervision unless the losses were in-
curred by governmental acts, e.g., if the business would not have been con-
ducted at all but for the Government, or if extra losses over what would have
been otherwise sustained were occasioned by Government operations. Wher6
the owner's losses are what they would have been without the 'taking,' the
owner has suffered no loss or damage for which compensation is due."'3
26 An owner could, of course, refuse to pay the ordered wage increase, preferring to allow
the strike to continue rather than pay higher wages. It is likely that one effect of such a refusal
would be to dispossess him of his plant. The government's objective in plant seizure is to in-
sure the continued operation of the vital business which it seizes, and it is not more likely to
permit the frustration of its objective by the recalcitrance of an owner than by his employees.
See The Coal Mines Regulations, Section 6o3.3I, Removal of Operating Managers, 8 Fed.
Reg. 6657 (1943). With regard to motor carriers, see Wheelock Bros., Inc. v. United States,88 F. Supp. 278, 281 (Ct. Cl., 1950).
'7 See note 23 supra.
28 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 120 (i951).
29 Ibid., at 120, 121. 30 Ibid., at 121.
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But it is difficult to reconcile these statements about compensation with the
conclusion that the Court of Claims award of $2,241.26 was proper under the
circumstances.3' The sentence last quoted above would seem, like justice Bur-
ton's opinion, to place upon the company the burden of showing that its losses
were greater than what they would have been without the taking-a showing
not made by Pewee. Presumably Justice Reed would base the award of the
$2,241.26 on the second of his two illustrations of "losses incurred by govern-
mental acts," for this sum, which "was expended without legal or business
necessity to do so" he calls an "extra allowance."32 That it was expended with-
out business necessity seems questionable, at least if it is a legitimate business
objective to keep operations going. In what sense the expenditure was "extra"
is not made clear. Manifestly, "extra losses" refers, in the Pewee case at least,
to the cost of obeying a specific government directive. Justice Reed would thus
substitute the showing of this cost for the burden, of proving financial harm
caused by the taking of less than the full use of a losing business. The effect of
this view would be to put upon the government the burden of paying for wage
increases which justice Burton would have the owner bear.
One can only speculate as to whether Justice Reed's view would remain un-
changed if the seized business were a profitable one. (If the owner is to be com-
pensated for the increase in losses due to extra wage payments, why not also for
a decrease in profits?) But if the government were required to bear the cost of
wage increases in all seized businesses, seizure would become a very expensive
and much less useful technique. Indeed, by furnishing an incentive to the owner
of a vital business to refuse to pay higher wages in the hope that through a
seizure the government could be made to pay for them, such a requirement
would tend to bring about the very strike which seizure was designed to prevent.
Although Justices Burton and Reed both agree that the government "took"
Pewee's property, 33 neither is willing to burden the government with all the con-
3' The opinion merely states, "Here the Court of Claims has correctly applied these prin-
ciples ..... "Ibid.
31 Ibid. Had Justice Reed intended to base the award on the first of his two illustrations
(i.e., losses incurred during the period of governmental supervision if the business would not
have been conducted at all but for the government), it would have been necessary to deter-
mine what Pewee's financial position would have been had it remained idle, which the opinion
does not do. Nor does the opinion indicate why this first illustration of a loss incurred by
governmental acts is not an illustration of the Pewee situation. Because the Pewee mine was
idle before the taking, there was no evidence that a private settlement of the strike was fore-
seeable, and the government taking was intended to have and did have the effect of putting
the mine back into operation immediately, without waiting for the dispute to be solved by
collective bargaining. Either justice Reed assumes the strike would shortly have been settled
or simply refuses to recognize its existence for the purpose of measuring compensation. In
any case, he is evidently unwilling to equate a stoppage due to a strike with a situation in
which "the business would not have been conducted at all but for the government."
33 Perhaps they were impelled to reach this conclusion by the Court's finding in United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (X947), that the government had
"seized actual possession of the mines," that the government was operating the mines, and that
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sequences of a taking. Neither therefore is willing to state precisely what interest
in property the government took nor to measure the value of its use. Justice
Burton, though he agrees "there was a 'taking' of the mining property,"34 im-
plicitly rejects this interpretation of the government's action by his refusal to
compensate Pewee for losses. If Pewee's property was legally taken, Pewee
could not logically be held responsible for what was done with the property after
it had passed into the hands of the taker.3s That Justice Reed would hold Pewee
only partly responsible does not relieve him of the contradiction. In fact he
seems to negate his admission of a taking explicitly by saying that "the Govern-
ment . . . 'takes' the property in the sense of assuming the responsibility of its
direction and employment for national purposes. .... ,,36 Under some circum-
stances the assumption of responsibility might constitute a taking, under others
not. But an examination of government acts to determine whether they consti-
tute a taking is a matter separate from the determination of the compensation
to be paid for a taking. The measure of this amount where property is taken
temporarily is the rental value of the property taken.37 Clearly the $2,241.26
which Justice Reed would award as just compensation was not meant to meas-
ure the rental value of any property taken from Pewee.
There have been few other cases on the measure of compensation for the tem-
porary taking of an operating business. In Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co.,"8
Justice Black's lease theory was adopted. The State of Virginia had seized a
strike-bound ferry company, ousted the owners from control, and operated the
ferry company through the State Highway Commissioner pursuant to statutory
authority.39 The company sued for the net profits for the period of temporary
operation as just compensation for the taking of its business, but the Supreme
Court of Virginia disallowed its claim. It said the measure of just compensation
could not be profits, for even if there had been losses the taker would have been
obligated to pay compensation.40 It adopted, as the proper measure of com-
pensation, "the fair market value of the right to use the properties of the ferry
company... ."41 Profits made during the period of temporary operation would
be admissible, it held, "as bearing on the question of fair rental value."42
"the relationship between the Government and the workers is that of employer and employee."
Ibid., at 289. As already noted, however, the Court explicitly declined to pass on the rela-
tionship between the government and the owner. Ibid., at 288.
34 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 121 (rg95).
3s See, e.g., E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924).
36 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 120 (105i).
3'Elements and Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain for Temporary Use and
Occupancy, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1297, 1299-1300 (195o), annotating Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. . (x949).
38 x86 Va. 481, 43 S.E. 2d IO (197).
39 Code of Virginia (Michie, sg5o), §§ 33-202-33-208.
40 Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 492, 43 S.E. 2d io, 16 (1947).
4' Ibid., at 494, 17. 2 Ibid.
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Marion and Rye Valley R. Co. v. United States43 was heavily relied upon by the
dissenting Justices in the Pewee case. The government by presidential proclama-
tion had "taken" the railroads of the country but, at least in the case of the
Marion and Rye Valley Railway, had done nothing to interfere in the operation
or management of the business. The owners were not ousted from control of
their railway nor were they appointed government agents. Justice Brandeis for
the Court did not decide whether the government's action constituted a taking
but said that even if it did no compensation could be recovered because nothing
of value had been taken.44
A third case, United States v. Wheelock Bros., InC.,45 a companion to the
Pewee case, was decided by the Court of Claims on the same theory it adopted
in its Pewee decision.46 But after granting certiorari the Supreme Court found it
lacked jurisdiction.47
In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,48 Justice Black's theory of the nature
of a temporary taking of property was clearly stated though the question of the
Pewee case was not presented because the government, which temporarily took
the claimant's laundry, used it exclusively for the army and not as a business
run for profit. The measure of compensation was held to be "the rental that
probably could have been obtained."49 The Court said: "Determination of the
value of temporary occupancy can be approached only on the supposition that
free bargaining between petitioner and a hypothetical lessee of that temporary
interest would have taken place in the usual framework of such negotiations."so
The lease theory of a temporary taking was also adopted in what is perhaps
the earliest instance of a temporary taking.S' It is at least impliedly accepted by
most of the cases involving a temporary taking of property; for, though all the
cases do not explicitly call the government a lessee, the measure of compensation
is generally said to be the rental value of the property taken.5' Except for the
Marion, Kimball, Anderson and Wheelock cases, however, these temporary tak-
ing cases do not involve the taking of a going business.
Both the Reed and Burton opinions cite the Marion case as justification for
dispensing with the rental value rule under the circumstances of the Pewee case.
But the claimant in the Marion case did not maintain that, because the railroad
company was "taken," the subsequent operation was for the account of the
government and that it, the claimant, was entitled to rental value. Instead the
Marion Company proceeded inconsistently with this theory; for, though it
43 270 U.S. 280 (1926).
44 Ibid., at 282. 4 341 U.S. 319 ('95').
46 Wheelock Bros., Inc. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 278, 283 (Ct. Cl. i95o).
47 United States v. Wheelock Bros., Inc., 341 U.S. 319, 320 (i95i).
48338 U.S. 1 (I949). 49 Ibid., at 7. so Ibid.
s, Johnson v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 391, 416 (1866).
S2 See note 21 supra.
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claimed compensation for the use of its property, it retained the profits from
operations and did not offer to give them up to the taker. Under these circum-
stances it is difficult to see hdw the Marion decision can be said to govern
Pewee's claim. Rather, it would appear that both the Reed and Burton opinions
are inconsistent with the theory of a taking of property.
On the other hand, both the Anderson and Kimball cases, each of which
jdopts the lease theory, are easily distinguishable from the Pewee case because
in each the owners were ousted from control over their business. Justice Black's
opinion, of course, is consistent with the statement, to which all the Justices
assented, that the government took Pewee's property. But a majority of the
Court did not agree with his conclusion as to what interest in property the gov-
ernment had taken. They therefore were able to give effect to the government's
intention to assume the role of employer vis-h-vis the miners, so as to induce
them to return to work, but to play, in Justice Reed's language, only "super-
visor" or "director" vis-h-vis the owners. And as Justice Black's interpretation
of the government's actions rested heavily upon the language of the seizure
orders,S3 a mere change in language might affect the view of some or all of the
Justices subscribing to his opinion.
On balance, it would appear that in a future seizure of an operating business
where the owners are not ousted from management but retain substantially
complete managerial control, the Court would be unlikely to interpret the gov-
ernment's action as a taking of the use of the business and an operation of it for
the government's account. To do less, however, would be to face the incon-
sistency found in the opinions of Justices Burton and Reed-that property may
be taken while the responsibilityfor its operation remains with those from whom
it was taken. To escape this inconsistency and to justify abandonment of the
rental value measure of compensation and, perhaps, the substitution of some
other measure, the Court would almost certainly have to spell out clearly its
own interpretation of what the government had done.s4 Two courses would
seem to be open. The government's contention that its directives to the coal
mine managers were within its regulatory powers might form the basis for a
theory consistent with both the power to decree a wage increase and operation
of the seized business for the company account.ss This would, of course, mean
abandonment of the theory of a taking. Or the Court might try, in the manner
unsuccessfully attempted by Justice Reed, to formulate grounds for a com-
s3 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, ii5-I6 (ig5i).
54 By coincidence, on the same day it handed down its decision in the Pewee case, the Court
adopted a new rule of civil procedure relating to the condemnation of property which requires
that the plaintiff in a. condemnation suit state, among other matters, the interest in property
to be acquired. Rule 71A, 341 U.S. 963 (1951).
55 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Madden in the Wheelock case, 88 F. Supp. 278, 284
(Ct. Cl., 1950). Compare, Brief for the United States on writ of certiorari to the Court of
Claims in Pewee, at 64-67, in Wheelock, at 39-52. See also the note in 64 Harv. L. Rev. 338
(x95o) on the Wheelock and Pewee decisions.
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promise position between a noncompensable regulation on the one hand, and a
complete, traditional taking on the other56
Unquestionably, Pewee has raised significant and perplexing problems. In-
deed, it has recently been called "the most important labor case of the year
.. ,"57 (emphasis supplied). Speculation about possible solutions aside, the prob-
lems certainly merit more detailed consideration than the rather cursory glances
bestowed upon them in Pewee.
VERTICAL FORESTALLING UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Monopolies and restraints of trade have traditionally been thought of in
terms of horizontal market power. A recent increase in the number of cases in-
volving exclusive dealing arrangements, resale price maintenance, boycotting
practices, tie-ins, certain forms of agency agreements and vertical integration
has pointed up the necessity of defining the extent of vertical control per-
missible under the Sherman,' Clayton2 and Federal Trade Commission Acts.3
A strong argument can be made that these forms of vertical forestalling4 can
have adverse effects on free competition only when used as a method of exploit-
ing horizontal monopoly power. The Supreme Court appears to have accepted
this argument with respect to vertical integration in recent cases holding that
vertical integration is not per se illegal. However, the use of intent and con-
spiracy doctrines in the integration cases seems to have extended the area of the
illegality despite the rejection of a per se rule.
With respect to looser forms of vertical forestalling, the cases state an even
broader prohibition. Resale price maintenance is clearly illegal per se, and
group boycotts may also fall within the "per se" category. In the field of exclu-
sive supply and tying contracts, the courts have also established broad rules
of illegality although a flat ban has not been reached. The cases applying these
broad rules have, however, generally involved horizontal market power suf-
s6 For a discussion of the differences between a regulation and a taking, see Governmental
Seizure of a Business to Prevent Strike Caused Work Stoppages-Regulation or Taking, ig
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 184 (i95o).
s7 Frank, The United States Supreme Court: i95o-5r, xg Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 167
(1952).
' 26 Stat. 209 (18go), as amended, i 5 U.S.C.A. § x et seq. ('g5i).
38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, i 5 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq. (i95i).
3 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, z5 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq. (i95i).
4 For the purposes of this comment, the phrase "vertical forestalling" will be used as a
generic phrase covering vertical control in all its forms ranging from outright vertical inte-
gration on the one extreme to exclusive dealing contracts and resale price maintenance on the
other. At common law, "forestalling" referred to the exclusion of goods or traders from a
market. Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent Misuse,
50 Col. L. Rev. 170, 176-79 (ig5o). With the exception of resale price maintenance, these
forms of vertical control involve the exclusion of outsiders from a certain market. Hence,
he phrase "vertical forestalling."
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